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- 1. At the session of the SED Central Committee held on 16 May 1955, criticism of the result of the Marsaw conference was openly voiced. Thus for example, Alfred Neumann spoke in this connection of "political opportunism" and of a shameful betrayal of the resolutions taken at the Mescow conference. Neumann's opinion was shared by Bruno Leuschner, Willy Stoph, and Erich Mueckenberger and, to a lesser extent, also by Meinrich Rau. These members of the SED Politburo hold that the Soviets allowed themselves to be pushed onto the defensive in the foreign-policy field. They believe that this attitude betrays opportunism and that it is bound to lead to new concessions in the German question. The end of the development may be the liquidation of the GDR. This group of critics also stated that the economic burdens imposed upon the GDR in Marsaw were out of all proportion to the political results reached there. The economic contribution demanded from the GDR for the defense of the Eastern Bloc was understood by nobody and would lead to new difficulties in the realization of production plans.
- 2. The opinion voiced by the group of critics of the Warsaw conference was not shared by another large and more influential group which included Pieck, Ulbricht, Grotewohl, Matern, Schirdewan, Oelssner, and Ebert. The members of the latter group, although depressed and disappointed by Warsaw, tried with little enthusiasm to justify the results of the Warsaw conference. Pieck and his followers are aware of the great danger interent in the new tactics of the USSR. The members of this group who defend the Warsaw pact believe it would have been better to force the Socialist reconstruction of the GDR after the ratification of the Paris agreements and to protect the Socialist achievements by the organization of a national army. In spite of their apprehensions, these politicians follow and back the Soviet line, an attitude which demands from them much patience and restraint.
- 3. No decision was taken at the conference of 16 May. It was stated, however, that the fight for the rounification of Germany was still the main task of the SED and the GDR. Ulbricht and Oelssner were charged with the preparation of the best political arguments for the defense of the Warsaw Agreements, which they were to submit to an extraordinary conference of SED agitators scheduled to be held in East Berlin on 23 and 24 May.

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